Asymmetries between uniqueness and familiarity in the semantics of definite descriptions by Srinivas, Sadhwi et al.
Proceedings of SALT 30: 694–713, 2020
Asymmetries between uniqueness and familiarity in the







Abstract In over a century of research into the English definite article the, two
main theoretical factors have been identified as relevant to its meaning: namely,
(i) uniqueness, and (ii) familiarity. The identification of these two factors has led
to an extensive debate in semantics about which of them is more fundamental to
the meaning of the. In this paper, we contribute to this debate by introducing novel
data obtained through two controlled psycholinguistic experiments. We manipulated
uniqueness and familiarity of potential referents, examining how these factors affect
the comprehension and production of English definite descriptions. The behavioral
results reveal an asymmetry between these two factors, with familiarity being a
weaker cue than uniqueness—a pattern that is unexpected under any existing theory
of definiteness. We close with a discussion of possible extensions to existing theories
in light of this result, as well as avenues for future work.
Keywords: definite descriptions, uniqueness, familiarity, behavioral experiments, MTurk
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the semantics of definite descriptions in English, character-
ized by the presence of the definite determiner the: for example, the sun, the cake
in the fridge, the chocolate cake, and so on. Here, we focus on their referential
uses alone, namely those in which they are intended to identify a particular referent
within the discourse context (Donnellan 1966). While it is generally agreed that
such referring definite descriptions denote ‘uniquely identifiable’ referents (Gundel,
Hedberg & Zacharski 1993), accounts of the definite article vary with regard to what
conditions are sufficient for a referent to achieve uniquely identifiable status. Two
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main factors have been proposed in the literature, namely, (i) uniqueness and (ii)
familiarity.
According to uniqueness theories of the definite article, a definite description
is felicitous if and only if there is a unique entity in the discourse context that
satisfies its descriptive content. This requirement is exemplified in (1) below, which
is infelicitous out of the blue. Since classes typically involve more than one student,
the definite description the student in my class describes more than one potential
referent, thus failing to refer uniquely.
(1) (out of the blue) #The student in my class came to office hour today.
Familiarity theories, in contrast, do not impose a uniqueness requirement, but instead
require the presence of a ‘familiar’ discourse referent. One common way for a
referent to become familiar is through mention within the discourse. For example, in
(2), native speakers of English tend to judge the anaphoric description the pen to be
felicitous, despite the presence of more than one pen in the context.
Context: There is more than one pen on the table, only one of them is red.
(2) The red peni that’s on the table is my favorite. My grandfather gave me the
peni as a birthday present last year.
The question of which of these two factors, uniqueness or familiarity, is fundamental
to the meaning of the definite article has received much attention within the formal
semantics literature: some have advocated for uniqueness (e.g., Russell (2005),
Strawson (1950), Barker (2004), Löbner (1985)), others have advocated for famil-
iarity (e.g., Christophersen (1939), Heim (1982), Kamp (1981)), and yet others have
argued that both factors are needed to account for the full distribution of the definite
article (e.g., Schwarz (2009), Farkas (2002), Rawlins (2005), Roberts (2003)).
In this paper, we contribute to this discussion by way of presenting novel behav-
ioral data from two experiments in which we manipulated uniqueness and familiarity.
Given that both uniqueness and familiarity have been claimed to affect the use of
definite descriptions, we believe that a quantitative evaluation of the contribution
of these factors can advance our understanding of these theoretical constructs. Our
main finding reveals an asymmetry between uniqueness and familiarity in both
comprehension and production, where familiarity is a weaker cue than uniqueness.
This is a result not obviously anticipated by any existing theory of definiteness, all
of which assume that the effect of these factors is categorical.
A detailed discussion of these experiments is given in Sections 2 and 3. In the
remaining part of this introductory section, we will discuss some specific construals
of uniqueness and familiarity that theories have relied on, which we have drawn
upon in our experimental design. In particular, the variation in how uniqueness and
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familiarity have been defined can be viewed as choice points for our design.
1.1 Uniqueness theories
While all uniqueness theories require the existence of a unique object satisfying the
definite description within a contextually restricted domain, one main dimension
along which they vary from each other is in how exactly they delimit this domain.
Standard versions of the uniqueness theory have tended to think of the referential
domain as being more or less fixed. For example, Russell (2005), Evans (1977),
Barker (2004) and Löbner (1985) take the domain to be delimited by the (global
or immediate) deictic context described by the utterance (semantic uniqueness, ter-
minology due to Roberts (2003)). A slightly weaker notion of uniqueness, namely
informational uniqueness, is proposed in Roberts (2003), where a referent is infor-
mationally unique if and only if it is the sole entity in the common ground shared
between the interlocutors to satisfy the definite description.
In this study, we examine situations that demarcate the same referential domain
under both semantic and informational uniqueness. That is, in the contexts described
within our experimental trials, both speaker and hearer of the definite description
have equal and full knowledge of the available referents. Our experiments thus test
the effectiveness of semantic/ informational uniqueness against familiarity, without
distinguishing between these two types of uniqueness.
More recent uniqueness-based proposals for definiteness allow for the identity
of the referential domain to be more variable. For example, Schwarz (2009) allows
uniqueness to be computed in one of several possible referential domains or situ-
ations. Heller, Parisien & Stevenson (2016) go one step further in proposing that
more than one domain is simultaneously considered (but weighted differently) in
interpreting a definite description. The notion of referential domains is not directly
manipulated within our experiments, but will prove relevant in considering how to
interpret the observed results. We revisit this point in Section 4.
1.2 Familiarity theories
According to familiarity theories, a definite description denotes a referent that is
familiar within the discourse context, regardless of whether it is unique in any strong
sense. The main question that arises within these theories then is that of what makes
a referent familiar. Two influential notions of familiarity exist in the literature:
strong familiarity (Heim 1982), and weak familiarity (Roberts 2003). Once again,
the terminology strong vs. weak is due to Roberts (2003).
The canonical way for a referent to become strongly familiar is through explicit
mention of the referent in discourse, like in (2), though high degrees of salience are
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also often said to contribute toward strong familiarity. For instance, Heim (1982)
says that her condition of strong familiarity requires “merely that there be a unique
relevant cat, or a unique most salient cat, or a unique cat that is the most likely
referent, or something of this sort.”1,2. In some cases where a referent is not strongly
familiar, but whose identity may be easily inferred by the hearer within the discourse
context (e.g., an utterance of the sun out of the blue), strong familiarity theories
allow for a process of accommodation, in which a novel referent may be added to
the discourse context prior to the interpretation of the definite description.
Roberts (2003) introduces the notion of weak familiarity, satisfied by any entity
whose existence is entailed by the context; if an entity is strongly familiar it is weakly
familiar, but not vice versa. On Roberts’ view, weak familiarity is a necessary
condition for the licensing of definite descriptions in addition to informational
uniqueness. This is motivated by a range of commonly occurring counterexamples to
strong familiarity, such as those in which speakers may refer to an entity that has not
been previously mentioned but whose existence may be inferred within the discourse
context—for e.g., the bridging context in (3) taken from Roberts (2003: 300).
(3) John was murdered yesterday. The knife lay nearby.
In the experiments described here, we leave open the question of how to assess
weak familiarity and manipulate only strong familiarity: whether an entity has been
explicitly mentioned. Weak familiarity, in contrast, is held constant: all referents are
known to the speaker and hearer to exist in the given context.
1.3 Hybrid theories
A third class of theories, which we term here as hybrid theories, take both uniqueness
and familiarity to play a role in the semantics of definite descriptions. Such hybrid
theories may further be divided into two types: (i) those that regard some notion of
both uniqueness and familiarity as simultaneously necessary (e.g., Roberts (2003),
Rawlins (2005)), and (ii) those that regard either as independently sufficient (e.g.,
Schwarz (2009), Farkas (2002), Beaver & Coppock (2015)).
We have already seen one example of the first of these types, namely Roberts
(2003) who takes both weak familiarity and informational uniqueness to be necessary
1 Note also the use of the word ‘unique’ in the quote from Heim (1982). This indicates a need for
uniqueness among strongly familiar referents for successful interpretation of the description. However,
under familiarity theories, this requirement is not conventionally encoded as a presupposition in
the definite article: it only emerges as a downstream requirement to allow successful referent
identification.
2 Other proposals have also sporadically tended to invoke the idea of maximal salience for characterizing
the referent picked out by definite descriptions: e.g., Lewis (1979) and Von Heusinger (2004).
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for a definite description to be licensed3. Among proposals of the second type, there
is further variation with respect to whether both factors must be incorporated within
a single, unified lexical entry for the, or whether there must be two separate lexical
entries: one corresponding to uniqueness and the other to familiarity. While Farkas’s
(2002) theory of Determined Reference as well as the proposal in Beaver & Coppock
(2015) are examples of the former, unified approach, Schwarz (2009) exemplifies
the latter, ambiguity-based approach. Based on languages like German which
morphologically separate uniqueness-denoting definite articles from familiarity-
denoting ones, Schwarz proposes that both these factors are independently involved
in the semantics of definiteness. The natural extension of Schwarz’s proposal to
English is to posit that there must be two independent lexical entries for the (though
no concrete proposal has yet been made along these lines for English).
1.4 The current study
We conducted two experiments, manipulating (semantic or informational) unique-
ness and strong familiarity. Specifically, we operationalized uniqueness by manipu-
lating whether or not there was a unique intended referent in the context satisfying
the descriptive content of the definite description. We operationalized strong famil-
iarity by way of mentioning one of the referents. Our set-up allows us to make clear
and concrete predictions with respect to the proposals described above. Observing
successful resolution of definite descriptions only in conditions where a unique refer-
ent is present, but not in conditions with a non-unique, familiar referent, will provide
support for theories relying on uniqueness. On the other hand, observing successful
referential behavior in the presence of familiar but not necessarily unique referents
will provide support for strong familiarity theories. Success across the board in
conditions where the referent is either unique or familiar will provide support for
the hybrid theories. Importantly, all predictions that can be directly derived from
existing theories are categorical, and as such, observing gradient behavioral patterns
is expected to pose a general challenge to any of them.
We tested the effects of these manipulations on two tasks: a comprehension
experiment (Experiment 1) and a production experiment (Experiment 2).
2 Experiment 1: Comprehension
In this experiment, participants were presented with a range of stories. Each story
included two referents that varied in whether they were uniquely described by the
definite description contained in the final sentence, as well as whether they had been
3 However, this seems to ultimately be a redundant specification, since weak familiarity as described in
Roberts (2003) is entailed by informational uniqueness.
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mentioned prior to the utterance of the final sentence. Participants were asked about
the interpretation of that definite description. In response, they could choose either
of the referents introduced in the context, or they could answer “I don’t know."
We included this latter option in order to provide the participants with a natural
way to respond in cases where they were unsure as to the identity of the intended
referent—especially within some of our trials which contained neither a uniquely
described nor a familiar referent. In such trials where the hearer would pick the
option “I don’t know”, the hearer may have responded with a clarification question
within a naturally occurring, conversational context.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
We recruited thirty two participants on Mechanical Turk, all of them located within
the US and self-reported native speakers of English (average age = 36 years). Each
participant was compensated with $2 USD upon completing the task. This study, as
well as the one reported in Section 3, were approved by the Johns Hopkins University
Institutional Review Board. Participants indicated their consent for participation by
clicking on an ‘Agree’ button after reading an information letter.
2.1.2 Materials
On each trial, participants read a story containing two potential referents, and
interpreted a critical definite description at the end of each story. The context in each
trial consisted of two interlocutors and two potential referents. For example, in the
trial shown in Table 1, the two interlocutors are the chef and his assistant, and the
two potential referents are the two baked goods.
Two factors were manipulated within a 2 x 2 within-subjects design: uniqueness
(-unique, +unique) and familiarity (-familiar, +familiar). In the -unique conditions,
there were two referents that fit the descriptive content of the critical definite de-
scription. For example, in the left column in Table 1, two cakes are introduced,
and so the critical description the cake (highlighted in gray ) could apply to either
cake. In contrast, within the +unique conditions, there was only one referent that
fit the descriptive content of the critical definite. For example, in the right column
in Table 1, a cake and a pie are introduced, and so the critical description the cake
(highlighted in gray ) only applies to the cake and not to the pie. Next, in the
-familiar conditions (the top row in Table 1), the intended referent is not mentioned
in the dialogue between the interlocutors prior to the critical description, whereas
in the +familiar conditions (the bottom row in Table 1), the intended referent is
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[-unique] [+unique]
[-familiar] A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a cake containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
the cake in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a pie containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
the cake in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
[+familiar] A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a cake containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
The chef’s assistant said,
“The cake with jam looks delicious! I
think we did a good job.”
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
the cake in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a pie containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
The chef’s assistant said,
“The cake with jam looks delicious! I
think we did a good job.”
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
the cake in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
Table 1 Example stimuli showing 2x2 manipulations of uniqueness and famil-
iarity (through mention) of referents within Experiment 1.
mentioned in the dialogue, thus making it strongly familiar.
We created thirty two stories in total. The materials were further counter-balanced
across items in various aspects. For example, in the +familiar conditions, half of
the items contained turn-taking between the interlocutors, whereas in the other half
the same interlocutor acted as the speaker throughout the dialogue phase. The items
were also counter-balanced in whether the intended referent was introduced as the
first or the second potential referent during the set-up phase. To make the dialogues
sound natural, the descriptive content of the referring expressions changed from a
longer, more modified first mentions to shorter, less modified critical descriptions
in the +familiar conditions, consistent with studies that establish this as the natural
progression over time for descriptions to the same object (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs
1986).
Each story was paired with a comprehension question regarding the identity of
the referent intended by the speaker of the critical definite description. For instance,
for the trial shown in Table 1, they were asked: “Which object does the chef want his
assistant to put in the fridge?”. In response, participants could choose one of three
possible responses: the intended referent (e.g., the cake filled with jam), the other
referent (e.g., the pie/cake containing dried fruits), or the option “I don’t know”. The
order of the two referents was counter-balanced across participants: while for half
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of the participants, the intended referent appeared first among the three options, it
appeared second for the other half. “I don’t know” always appeared as the third and
final option. Each story was instantiated in all four conditions: [-unique, -familiar],
[-unique,+familiar], [+unique, -familiar], and [+unique, +familiar]. However, no
participant saw the same story in more than one condition. Instead, each participant
saw eight stories in each of the four conditions, namely thirty two trials in total.
2.1.3 Procedure
Participants performed the task online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk interface.
Participants were told that they would read short stories and answer questions about
them. They were instructed to read the stories carefully, and answer the question that
follows. We told participants that in some cases the answer may be obvious, while
in other cases, they may be less sure. Participants saw each story on a new screen:
they could not skip any trial, and could not go back and change their answers. All in
all, the task lasted about 20 minutes on average.
2.2 Results
Figure 1 depicts the full pattern of choices made by participants within each of the
four conditions. Each bar is divided into regions of varying darkness, with each
region representing the proportion of trials where participants chose a particlar type
of referent. The darkest regions denote the proportion of choices to the intended
referent (that is, the uniquely described referent in the +unique conditions, and the
familiar referent in [-unique,+familiar]), the lighter regions denote the proportion
of choices to the competing referent, and the lightest regions denote the proportion
where participants chose the option “I don’t know”.
We examined these patterns statistically by fitting a mixed-effects logistic regres-
sion model with repeated contrasts (Schad, Vasishth, Hohenstein & Kliegl 2020). In
effect, this method treats the combination of uniqueness and familiarity as a single,
four-level manipulation This coding scheme allowed us to make the following three
comparisons: (i) comparing [-unique,-familiar] to [-unique,+familiar] to test the
effect of familiarity, (ii) comparing [-unique,+familiar] to [+unique,-familiar] to
compare familiarity alone against uniqueness alone, and (iii) comparing [+unique,-
familiar] to [+unique,+familiar] to ask whether familiarity has any effect when
uniqueness is already satisfied. The dependent binary variable indicated whether the
intended referent had been correctly chosen within a trial (coded as 1), or not (coded
as 0): this corresponds to the darkest regions of the bars in Figure 1. The model also
included random intercepts and all random slopes for participants and items.
We begin our discussion of the results by first considering participants’ behavior
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Figure 1 The referent participants chose across the four conditions in response to
the critical definite description: the intended referent (darkest bars), the
other referent (lighter bars), or “I don’t know” (lightest bars).
in the [-unique,-familiar] condition (grey bar in Figure 1). As expected, participants
were the least sure in this condition, choosing the option “I don’t know” 54% of the
time, and the two possible referents roughly equally: 20% for the intended referent,
and 26% for the other referent. In the [-unique,+familiar] condition (blue bar), the
intended referent was now chosen more often at 66%. Our model indicated that this
was a significant increase from (β = 2.6, SE = 0.43, z = 6.1, p < .001), indicating
that making a referent familiar by mention makes it a more likely candidate to be
picked out by a definite description. Next, when the intended referent was instead
unique but not familiar [+unique,-familiar] (yellow bar), it was selected at 80%:
importantly, this is a significant increase from the [-unique,+familiar] condition (β =
1.3, SE = 0.38, z = 3.4, p < .001). This difference between between uniqueness and
familiarity is surprising under any theory that takes them to be equal cues. Finally,
in the [+unique,+familiar] condition, the intended referent was chosen numerically
more at 88% compared to the [+unique,-familiar] condition; however, this difference
was not significant (β = 0.5, SE = 0.42, z = 1.25, p = .21), indicating that familiarity
and uniqueness do not together provide a stronger cue than uniqueness alone.
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2.3 Discussion
In line with existing theories of definiteness, our experimental results show that
each of uniqueness and familiarity (instantiated in the form of previous mention)
can individually influence the interpretation of a definite description. However, our
findings contribute a novel perspective as they reveal that uniqueness is a stronger
cue than familiarity, an asymmetry that is unexpected under existing theories.
One important discrepancy between the predictions made by existing theories
and what we have observed in our experiment pertains to the expectations within
these theories of categorical patterns of behavior. For instance, standard uniqueness
theories relying on the notions of semantic or informational uniqueness tend to
predict complete failure of reference in the absence of a uniquely-described referent,
without regard to whether one of the non-unique, potential referents is familiar.
Similarly, standard familiarity theories assume complete referential success in the
presence of a familiar referent, even if a stronger notion of uniqueness is violated, and
thus do not anticipate any difference in behavior between [-unique,+familiar] and
the [+unique,+familiar] conditions. Categorical predictions are made by the hybrid
theories as well: while these do expect effects of both uniqueness and familiarity,
they are taken to be equally necessary or independently sufficient cues, and as such,
no asymmetry is predicted. However, our experimental results point towards the
need for a theory of definite description comprehension that anticipates systematic
gradience of the form observed. Furthermore, the fact that we found that both
uniqueness and familiarity serve as a cue for referent choice, suggests that some
version of a hybrid theory is needed.
However, before we turn to consider how to extend existing theories in light of
the observed result, we need to consider a possible objection to our experimental task.
Specifically, one may argue that the observed pattern of comprehension alone may
not reflect the felicity of uniqueness and familiarity as cues in the interpretation of
definite descriptions. In other words, while participants may be less likely to choose
the intended referent in [-unique,+familiar], they nevertheless find the definite
description as felicitous in this context as in the +unique conditions. We argue that
our results show that both uniqueness and familiarity lead to the felicity of a definite
description: either cue alone leads to choosing the intended referent on the majority
of trials. However, we further argue that considering quantitative measurements
of the preferences of interpretation can advance our understanding of these cues.
Nevertheless, to ensure that the asymmetry between uniqueness and familiarity is
not a by-product of the forced choice task, we conducted a second experiment where
referring expressions were not interpreted by rather produced.
A different concern with the current setup is the operationalization of familiarity.
Recall that in each trial, the context introduced the interlocutors and potential
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referents which created the set up for the dialogue. Throughout in our discussion, we
have assumed that a referent becomes strongly familiar only if it has been mentioned
prior to the critical description in the dialogue phase of the story. However, we note
that the contextual set-up was also done via the use of language, and so the initial
introduction of the referents may have sufficed to make them ‘familiar’ from the
perspective of the participants, even though the referents were not strongly familiar
to the interlocutors in the story. To address this issue, we are planning to introduce
the referents non-linguistically in further iterations of this study, through the use of
images4. However, within the current study, note that even if both potential referents
were strongly familiar in our stories, the observed results nevertheless reveal an
asymmetry between uniqueness and familiarity that is not predicted by any existing
theory. The presence of more than one familiar referent is expected to lead to failure
of interpretation even under strong familiarity theories like Heim’s as well as weak
familiarity theories like the one in Roberts (2003), which do not anticipate the partial
success that we observed in identifying the target in [-unique,+familiar].
3 Experiment 2: Production
In this experiment, participants were presented with the same context stories as in
Experiment 1, except the final definite description was replaced by an empty text
box, and participants were asked to provide a natural completion to the story.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Thirty two participants in the United States, all of whom were self reported native
speakers of English, were recruited via Mechanical Turk (average reported age = 38
years). Each of them was compensated with $2 USD for their time.
3.1.2 Materials
The materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1, except that the critical
definite description was now replaced with an empty text box—see Table 2.
4 Some readers may object to this as well: even if the introduction of the referent is not via explicit
mention, it may still be ‘salient’ enough to be strongly familiar. We acknowledge this concern, and
further note that it is tricky to address what exactly constitutes ‘salience’ of a referent, and how much
salience is enough to constitute strong familiarity. Without a precise theory that does not simply rely
on an intuitive notion of this concept, it is difficult to control this factor within an experiment such as
the one described here. But one solution may be to view familiarity or salience as a gradient concept
to begin with. We revisit this point in the general discussion of our findings in Section 4.
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[-unique] [+unique]
[-familiar] A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a cake containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a pie containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
[+familiar] A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a cake containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
The chef’s assistant said,
“The cake with jam looks delicious! I
think we did a good job.”
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
A chef and his assistant were working
together in the kitchen. On the counter,
there was a pie containing dried fruit
and a cake filled with jam.
The chef’s assistant said,
“The cake with jam looks delicious! I
think we did a good job.”
Then, the chef said, “Can you put
in the fridge? It must be cool
before we frost it.”
Table 2 Example of stimuli used in Experiment 2. The grey box represents the
text box where participants freely typed in their response.
3.1.3 Procedure
Participants performed the task online through Mechanical Turk. Participants were
told that they would read stories in which some details are missing, and their
task was to fill in the missing information. Participants were further informed the
missing information may be more obvious in some case and less obvious in other
cases. Importantly, we did not give participant any further instructions about what
information they should put in the text box.
3.2 Results
While the task was highly unconstrained, the context restricted grammatical com-
pletions to noun phrases. Indeed, participants produced appropriate noun phrases
on 80% of the trials. The most common noun phrase type was definite descriptions
(55%), but participants also produced demonstratives (14%), pronouns (6%), and
even indefinite descriptions (5%). In a few cases, participants produced bare nouns,
which are not grammatical.
We focus our attention on the produced definite descriptions, specifically those
descriptions that refer to the intended target referent. Such descriptions amounted to
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Figure 2 % of bare definite descriptions (without any disambiguating modifier)
used across the four conditions of uniqueness and familiarity.
about 30% of the observed data (though definite descriptions amounted to 55% of
the observed data, about half of these clearly referred to something other than the
target, such as the distractor: the pie with dried fruit, the target and the distractor:
the cakes, or an altogether different object in the scene). In particular, we examine
the proportion of definite descriptions that were produced without any adjectival or
prepositional modifiers, namely expressions of the form the cake for the example
shown in Table 2, instead of expressions like the cake with jam or the jam cake. Our
logic is that if participants deemed the preceding context to license an unmodified
definite description for the intended referent, they would be more likely to use
the unmodified description (the cake) over a longer, presumably costlier and more
redundant modified version (the cake with jam). Thus, in the +unique conditions in
Table 2, if the presence of a unique cake is sufficient to license the description the
cake, then people would likely use this description over the cake with jam. Similarly,
in the +familiar conditions, if familiarity (through previous mention) of the cake
filled with jam is sufficient to license the unmodified definite description the cake,
people are expected to use an unmodified description.
Figure 2 plots the proportion of unmodified definite descriptions across the four
conditions. We examined these data statistically by fitting a 2x2 mixed-effects
logistic regression model. The dependent variable was whether the definite descrip-
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tion produced to describe the intended referent included a modifier (coded as 0)
or not (coded as 1). The two categorical independent variables were coded using
weighted-effects coding (using the wec package in R; Te Grotenhuis, Pelzer, Eisinga,
Nieuwenhuis, Schmidt-Catran & Konig (2017)), which has important advantages
over traditional effect coding when analyzing unbalanced data such as in our case,
where restricting the analysis to a subset of the production data resulted in different
numbers of observations for each level of uniqueness and familiarity. This resulted in
the following contrasts: (a) uniqueness: -unique -1.2 vs. +unique 1; (b) familiarity:
-familiar -1.15 vs. +familiar 1. In choosing the random effects, we considered all
random effect structures ranging from simplest to most complex, selecting the one
with the best AIC fit. The best-fitting model included a random intercept for items, a
random intercept for participants, and a random uniqueness slope for participants.
Regression results revealed that unmodified definite descriptions were produced
significantly more in the +unique than the -unique conditions (65% vs. 45% in
Figure 2: β = 1.1, SE = 0.35, z = 3.1, p = .002), indicating that uniqueness in
the discourse context licensed more bare descriptions, compared to context which
included two objects of the same kind. In contrast, familiarity did not have the
same effect: a [-unique, +familiar] referent was referred to with an unmodified
definite just as much as a [-unique, -familiar] referent (46% vs. 44%: β = -0.27,
SE = 0.18, z = -1.5, p = .14). This indicates that familiarity alone does not render
the referent appropriate for an unmodified definite description in a parallel way
to uniqueness, thus mirroring the asymmetry between uniqueness and familiarity
observed in Experiment 1.
3.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 also revealed a similar asymmetry as in Experiment 1,
since the presence of a uniquely described referent led to the use of more unmod-
ified subsequent descriptions to the target referent than the presence of a familiar
(mentioned) but NOT uniquely described referent. Taken together, the results from
both experiments constitute novel evidence that both uniqueness and familiarity of a
referent can license definite descriptions in English, albeit to varying degrees.
We might wonder why the proportion of unmodified descriptions was not dif-
ferent between [-unique,-familiar] and [-unique,+familiar], contrasting with the
comprehension results that showed a significant effect of familiarity. We speculate
that this could arise from an asymmetry between comprehension and production,
wherein the cooperative hearer maximizes the utilization of the cues available in
interpretation, while the cooperative speaker prioritizes the use of stronger cues
over weaker ones. An alternative hypothesis emerges if, following Kehler & Rohde
(2013), any factor that helps with comprehension alone but not production is one that
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is not directly relevant to the lexical semantics of the referring expression. Under this
view, we might then expect that uniqueness is lexically encoded in the definite article,
but familiarity effects follow from more general pragmatic principles that influence
comprehension of reference. This would provide an alternative view of the observed
uniqueness-familiarity asymmetry which supports a categorical uniqueness theory
of the definite article over the hybrid one. This interpretation is further discussed in
Section 4 below.
We might additionally wonder about is why participants did not produce more
pronouns in the +familiar conditions, where they arguably sound more natural
than even unmodified definite descriptions. Here, it may have been the case that
participants’ exposure to trials belonging to the -familiar conditions which did not
license the use of pronouns led them to disprefer the use of pronouns in +familiar as
well (a task effect, akin to ‘lexical entrainment’, cf. Garrod & Anderson (1987)).
4 General discussion
In this paper, we described two behavioral experiment that examine the comprehen-
sion (Experiment 1) and production (Experiment 2) of English definite descriptions,
examining the effects of uniqueness and familiarity on the quantitative patterns of
reference comprehension and production. Both comprehension and production pat-
terns revealed an asymmetry between uniqueness and familiarity. In comprehension,
both uniqueness and familiarity independently licensed a definite description, but
familiarity was a weaker cue. In production, familiarity led to fewer unmodified
definite descriptions.
What does the observed asymmetry mean for existing theories of definiteness?
Given that we found an effect of both uniqueness and familiarity in comprehension,
some version of a hybrid theory seems necessary at a first glance to explain the full
distribution of the definite article. However, no existing hybrid theory is appropriate,
since (i) they predict only categorical results, and (ii) they predict uniqueness and
familiarity to be equally effective, and thus do not anticipate the observed asym-
metry between them. While it may be possible to probabilistically extend existing
proposals, there is more than one way to do so in light of the experimental results.
Here, we discuss two options: one that incorporates probabilistic uncertainty in
computing a referent’s uniqueness, and another that incorporates a probabilistic
notion of familiarity.
While uniqueness of a referent relative to a definite description is generally
categorical within a given referential domain (the referent is either the only item in
the domain that the description can apply to, or it is not), uncertainty about a refer-
ent’s uniqueness may be indirectly introduced via uncertainty about the referential
domain itself. The idea of uncertainty in referential domains has been most explic-
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itly discussed within the psycholinguistic literature on the processing of referring
expressions, particularly in cases involving a mismatch between the knowledge state
of the hearer and the speaker (Heller et al. (2016), Mozuraitis, Stevenson & Heller
(2018)). These studies show that interlocutors’ observed behavior in interpreting
definite descriptions in such situations is most accurately explained by assuming
that they simultaneously consider both their own perspective and their partner’s.
Rephrased in terms of referential domains, this means that the privileged interlocutor
computes reference simultaneously in two domains: one corresponding to their
own knowledge state which does not exclude the privileged object, and another
corresponding to their conversational partner’s which does exclude this item.
This idea of simultaneous consideration of more than one referential domain can
be extended to our experimental trials as well. Specifically, we might take the deictic
context surrounding the dialogue (i.e, what is introduced in the set-up phase of our
stories) as one candidate for the referential domain—let us call this domain RD-1,
while the narrow discourse context consisting solely of referents that have been
explicitly mentioned is another candidate (RD-2). Thus, in the [-unique,+familiar]
condition in Table 1, RD-1 consists of both the cakes but RD-2 only consists of the
previously mentioned jam-filled cake. The intermediate proportion of choices to the
familiar referent observed within this condition suggests that a weighted average
of both these domains is considered. On the other hand, in [+unique,+familiar],
the intended referent is uniquely described in both domains, and will therefore be
picked invariably of the weights associated with each domain. To decide whether
this alternative is indeed viable, we need a better understanding of the types of
referential domains that interlocutors are sensitive to: for instance, whether domains
are restricted to situations associated with a place, time and point of view, or can they
be defined more narrowly to consist only of some parts of a discourse context but
not others. We would also need to test the comprehension and production of definite
descriptions within experimental stimuli that explicitly manipulate this notion.
A second alternative would be to introduce uncertainty about the familiarity status
of the intended referent. As stated above, under a particular choice of referential
domain, uniqueness of the referent given a description is categorical. However,
familiarity may be graded, wherein entities may be more or less familiar. Under
this view, previous mention of a potential referent in our experiments would be
viewed as increasing that referent’s familiarity by a significant—–but crucially, not
maximal—level, resulting in the graded result in the [-unique,+familiar] condition.
This option too requires further empirical testing to attest viability. For instance,
follow-up norming studies would need to independently measure whether familiarity
is indeed graded, the factors that lead to an increase or reduction of the familiarity
of a referent, and whether success in comprehension experiments is correlated with
independent measurements of familiarity—regardless of the referential domains.
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Apart from choosing how to introduce uncertainty within the model, attempting
to probabilistically extend existing theories in the ways discussed above leaves us
with yet another dimension of choice: namely, whether to posit a unified lexical
entry for the definite article, or whether to posit ambiguity. While a unified semantics
may be somewhat more parsimonious for English (which does not morphologically
differentiate between the uniqueness and familiarity articles), the fact that there
exist languages that separate the two forms, along with a universality assumption
that all languages of the world instantiate lexical items with identical underlying
semantics might bias us towards positing ambiguous semantics for English the as
well. Both unified and ambiguity-based analyses are thus possible in principle, but
we would like to point out that the graded results we observed in our experiments
speak in favor of a unified account, at least at a first glance. This is because within
an ambiguity analysis, making only one of the lexical entries encode probabilistic
gradience (e.g., the one corresponding to familiarity) makes the other, categorical
entry (e.g., the one corresponding to uniqueness) redundant—since in the absence
of further stipulations, the probabilistic entry is powerful enough to also handle the
categorical edge case (e.g., a case where a referent is uniquely described though not
maximally familiar).
Finally, a third possibility is to take as our starting point the observation that par-
ticipants were NOT more likely to describe the familiar referent in [-unique,+familiar]
with an unmodified definite description than the non-unique, non-familiar referent
in [-unique,-familiar]. This opens up yet another interpretation of the observed
results favoring a categorical uniqueness theory of definiteness. Such an interpre-
tation crucially involves adopting Kehler & Rohde’s (2013, 2019) proposal that
comprehension and production processes in reference do not exactly mirror each
other. According to this, comprehension of referring expressions is affected by
general considerations of discourse coherence in addition to the lexical meaning
encoded within the expression, but their production is only affected by the latter5. In
other words, the meaning encoded in the referring expression (definite descriptions,
in our case) is reflected most clearly in production but not comprehension. For
our experiments, this would mean that uniqueness alone is lexically encoded in
the definite article, while familiarity of the referent only serves to affect discourse
5 More precisely, Kehler & Rohde (2013, 2019) propose that comprehension and production are
systematically related to each other via the Bayes’ rule, as shown below:
(i) P(referent | expression) ∝ P(expression | referent) * P(referent)
According to this expression, the probability of interpreting a referring expression to denote a
particular referent P(referent | expression) depends on whether the lexical meaning of the expression
makes it appropriate to describe that referent P(expression | referent), as well as the prior probability
P(referent) of the referent being mentioned at all, as determined by coherence considerations.
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coherence expectations. Note that this explanation requires us to adopt a more
unconventional processing model than the one assumed to be default in the literature,
wherein comprehension and production processes necessarily mirror one another
(see Kehler & Rohde (2019) for further discussion of this point). Testing this al-
ternative would require independently measuring whether familiarity does indeed
affect coherence expectations, gauging the extent to which speakers use unmodified
definite descriptions for a given referent using sentence completion tasks.
More broadly, the current study illustrates the importance of quantitatively
evaluating semantic theories by examining fine-grained patterns of language com-
prehension and production that may reveal gradient patterns that are not easily
detectable using a small number of examples. The preceding discussion also brings
out the necessity for simultaneous evaluation of semantic competence accounts (usu-
ally investigated within formal semantics via the use of introspective examples) and
performance or processing accounts (investigated within psycholinguistics through
controlled experiments), since the competence account that one chooses implicitly
fixes a processing account when explaining behavioral results, and vice versa.
5 Conclusion
In sum, our experimental investigation of uniqueness and familiarity in the compre-
hension and prediction of definite descriptions revealed a novel asymmetry between
these two factors, where familiarity is a weaker cue than uniqueness. This finding
cannot be accounted for without extending existing analyses of definiteness in the
theoretical literature, all of which predict categorical judgments rather than system-
atic gradience. Many existing proposals are compatible with several probabilistic
extensions that could potentially account for the data we present here, but further
empirical work would be necessary to decide between the available options.
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